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Russia: No Strategic Partnership
With China in View
Iliyas Sarsembaev
1 2005 was rich in geopolitical and military events involving Russia in Central and East
Asia: there were the Kaspiy Anti-Terror military manoeuvres of the Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO) held in Kazakhstan in August1; the Andijan revolt in May
followed  by  tensions  between  Uzbekistan  and  the  United  States  and  by  a
rapprochement  between  Moscow  and  Tashkent;  the  Sino-Russian  manoeuvres  in
August; the Indo-Russian manoeuvres in October; all these punctuated by numerous
journeyings by the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov, across the region. What
does  this  Russian activism signify?  Is  Moscow intending a  return to  the  Asian and
Central-Asian strategic stage? Do the Russians seek to create a regional alliance with, in
particular, China and India, directed against the United States and its allies? Do these
political manoeuvres portend an imminent jolt to the balance of forces in Asia?
2 The Andijan revolt, in May 2005, was reported by some Western journalists as a pro-
democracy movement, ascribed by others to Islamists, or again, it was interpreted as an
attempt  to  overthrow President  Islam Karimov by  a  competing  clan.  Whatever  the
causes of that event, its direct consequences were the closure of the American base in
Uzbekistan and the intensification of political repression against remaining political
opponents, sharply criticised by Europe and the United States. In the Russian press,
beyond all else, the Andijan events fed the theory that Tashkent was staging a return to
Russia’s  sphere of  geopolitical  influence.  Similarly,  the joint Sino-Russian and Indo-
Russian military manoeuvres have also occasioned numerous articles, in the Russian
press and on pro-government websites2, on the Kremlin’s “new breakthrough” into the
post-Soviet  era  and  the  renaissance  of  Russian  power.  The  media  applies  itself  to
underlining the readiness  of  President Putin’s  team to restore the greatness of  the
Russian state, ravaged by the years of “savage democracy” (dikaya demokratizaciya)
under Boris Yeltsin’s leadership. But faced with this propaganda, various opposition
movements,  from  communists  to  nationalists,  criticise  the  “controlled  decadence”
(upravlyaemyi raspad) of the Russian state, at both the socio-economic and the military
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levels.  On  the  domestic  political  scene,  the  insistence  on  Russia’s  alliances  and  its
geopolitical successes is broadly aimed at containing this growing discontent.
3 This  article  seeks  first  of  all  to  show that  the  Shanghai  Co-operation  Organisation
(SCO)3 is  an  attempt  to  create  a  political bloc  that  is  not based  on  any  solid  legal
foundation or on any mutual obligation linking the participating countries. Despite the
manoeuvring of Russian diplomats to attract new members to the group, such as India
and Iran,  the  prospects  for  converting  the  SCO into  an effective  structure  are  still
rather  vague.  Whatever  efforts  the Russian government may be  making to  convert
India to the idea of building a union between the three countries, there is no question
of  multilateral  integration  in  the  SCO  structures:  decision-making  is  still  bilateral
(Russo-Indian or Russo-Chinese). It is also important to take account of the fact that the
Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry is at present better equipped for managing bilateral
relations than multilateral  relations:  it  operates through different departments and
highly specialised services, and can count on few staff working to promote multilateral
co-operation.
4 Secondly,  the  article  describes  the  significant  progress  made towards  consolidating
military  forces  within  the  context  of  the  Collective  Security  Treaty  Organisation
(CSTO). Yet, this organisation is far from forming a real politico-military bloc of ex-
USSR countries. It is no more than an attempt, on the part of the Russian Federation, to
redefine its own area of influence. Moscow’s initiatives in this sphere over these past
two years  show that  building  up the  CSTO is  being  achieved far  more  rapidly  and
efficiently than the efforts towards integration within the SCO. But the acceleration of
this process is coming up against several obstacles. In particular, there are tensions
within the governing class as well as a lack of clear-sightedness or political will when it
comes to the prospects for re-establishing power in the post-Soviet world. Indeed, the
confrontation between the new elite (“new Russians”,  bankers,  liberal  businessmen,
oligarchs) and the representatives of the old Soviet military-industrial complex does
not favour the shaping of a clear national idea. Such internal tensions within Russian
society  also  impede  the  smooth  running  of  government  agencies,  and  have  a
particularly  deleterious  effect  on  the  financing  of  military  programmes  and  the
equipping of the federal armed services. These difficulties notwithstanding, the CSTO
structures are much more active than the “amorphous mass” of the SCO: they make up
the spine of  what  could come to  be  a  military  force,  one that  might,  for  example,
intervene  in  cases  of  internal  conflict  within  the  Central-Asian  space  of  the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). One such case was the CSTO’s participation
in the “pacification” of the situation in Bishkek, in March 2005, which kept chaos at bay
in  Kyrgyzstan4.  Even  so,  it  is  still  rather  early  to  claim  that  Russia  and  the  other
members of the CSTO are on the eve of creating a real military union. This stage is not
foreseeable without radical changes to the ideology that underlies Russian political life
and without a greater affirmation of will by the CSTO members.
5 Finally, we shall emphasise that it takes more than mere willpower to create a political
alliance.  Russia cannot realistically claim to strengthen its  strategic partnerships in
Central  and East  Asia without resolving the serious problems affecting the national
economy and the federal army. Otherwise, any political union can only change into an
alliance between unequal partners: a strong China, a weak Russia and the handful of
“spare parts” represented by the other countries of the former Soviet Union. So it is
important  to  question  the  effective  capacity  of  Russia  to  implement  its  plans  for
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military integration, whether in the Central Asian area or within the Moscow-Delhi-
Peking relationship.
Towards a Sino-Indo-Russian alliance?
6 Some politicians yearn for the creation of a great coalition uniting India, Russia and
China and capable of matching the power of the “Golden Billion”, specifically Europe
and the United States, whose people are rich economically but demographically weak5.
The notion of strengthening Sino-Russian relations has been revived since the war in
Yugoslavia, on the eve of Boris Yeltsin’s political retirement. During his last visit to
Peking, in 1998, the Russian President declared that the United States could not enforce
its will on China and Russia. This declaration was taken by the Americans as a threat to
create a Sino-Russian bloc, although Chinese diplomats swiftly distanced themselves
from the idea. When Evgeny Primakov was Foreign Minister in 1999, Asia was a priority
concern  for  Russian  foreign  policy.  Even  since  his  resignation,  this  former  Prime
Minister,  now head of  the Russian Chamber of  Commerce and Industry,  still  wields
decisive influence over Russia’s policy towards Asia6. The dream of an alliance between
three of the biggest and most populous countries on the planet, in which Moscow could
again play a significant role, has its roots back in the time of the Comintern, when the
Kremlin’s  emissaries  were  striving  to  create  a  military  alliance  with  Sun  Yat-sen’s
China. Yet, most Russian Sinologists7 exclude, in principle, any possibility of a union
with China. They point, rightly, to the lessons of the history of Sino-Russian relations,
marked by incessant conflicts ever since the sixteenth century8. The renaissance of a
“Sino-Soviet friendship”, as reflected in attempts at political and economic integration,
could have catastrophic consequences for Russia. It would be forced into a situation of
inferiority, given the central government’s weak control over the Russian Far Eastern
Federal District and the absence of a clear line on foreign policy. The plan for a close
Sino-Russian  alliance  is  further  discredited  by  the  fact  that  China  has  already
repeatedly declared9 its opposition to forming a union with any other country―Russia
included10.
7 Bringing India into a Sino-Russian union seems even less realistic. The alliance between
China and India, whose frontier dispute is still not settled, is undermined by India’s
desire to control the situation in South Asia―in opposition to China’s wishes. A Russo-
Indian  rapprochement  seems  just  as  improbable:  it  is  difficult  to  understand  what
Primakov  may  have  been  referring  to  when  he  spoke  of  the  “coincidence  of the
interests of India and Russia in the Pacific area”11. The main raison d’être for any Russo-
Indian union would be as a defence against Chinese domination in the Pacific region12.
If India did need to form a friendship with another geopolitical power in the Central
Asian region, it  would more probably be with the United States than with China or
Russia.  The  recent  Russo-Indian  military  manoeuvres  (“Indra  2005”),  October  16th
2005, are admittedly a symbolic step towards realising Primakov’s idea; but they were
an extremely limited affair―only 130 Russian soldiers and 90 Indian soldiers actually
took part.
8 Even  so,  information  from  sources  within  the  CSTO  in  Moscow  suggests  that,  in
February 2006,  the Russian Foreign Affairs  Ministry opened discussions with Indian
diplomats on the possibility of enlarging the SCO and on whether Delhi might possibly
take part in its forums. There are two reasons behind the interest shown by India in
joining  this  organisation.  Firstly,  because  of  the  unstable  situation  created  by  the
possibility of a military crisis over Iran, India is forced into seeking to secure, as quickly
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as  possible,  access  to  energy  sources  in  post-Soviet  Central  Asia,  sources  whose
availability  would  be  guaranteed  by  some  political  and  military  mechanism:  in  an
emergency, the CSTO institutions could be mobilised to ensure the security of gas and
oil  production  in  the  region.  Secondly,  a  war  against  Iran  could  destabilise  India’s
neighbour  Pakistan,  where  radical  Islamists  are  influential:  this  could  amount  to  a
serious threat to the stability of the whole region. While the question of whether Iran
possesses nuclear weapons remains hypothetical, Pakistan on the other hand does have
a successfully tested nuclear device..., which might then fall into Islamist hands. Thus,
although Washington strives to keep India within the sphere of its own Asian policy,
the prospect of a big blow-up in Asia would tend rather to impel India towards a union
with Russia and China. In these conditions, Primakov’s dream of a great Russo-Sino-
Indian union, which could take shape under SCO auspices, appears less unrealisable,
despite the rivalry between India and China over political and military domination in
Asia.  But  it  would  take  a  considerable  time  to  build  up  real  mechanisms  for
management and decision-making13.
9 It appears then that one of the major factors limiting the possibilities for geopolitical
alliance between Russia and other countries in Asia is the Kremlin’s failure, ever since
1991, to develop a long-term regional strategy. Sociologically, the fact that the Russian
elite is concentrated in Moscow contributes to their indecisiveness about the regions
lying east  of  the Urals,  of  which their  knowledge is  very incomplete.  Most  Russian
Sinologists,  such  as  Viktor  Larin14 or  Yuri  Galenovitch 15,  consider  that  the  Russian
government maintains very little control over the regions of the Russian Far East16.
Russia cannot be ready for an alliance with China or India when it it is still at the stage
of strengthening state control over the eastern part of its own territory.
A development in the Sino-Russian military balance of power unfavourable to Russia
10 The  military  factor  is  equally  important  in  explaining  the  danger  for  Russia  of  an
unbalanced union with China. The rundown in the Russian armed services since 1991
when combined with the strengthening of the Chinese army has altered the balance of
power on the military level. The modernisation of the Russian army, as described in
outline by Vladimir Putin in November 2005 at  a  meeting with staff  officers of  the
federal  army,  seems  for  the  present  to  be  little  more  than  words.  Promises  to
modernise technical equipment between now and 2015 are no compensation for the
fact that many servicemen are still being paid several months in arrears. Strengthening
the Russian army seems to come down to saturation media coverage of a few token
events: Putin in the cockpit of a Tu 160 nuclear bomber launching a new missile, Putin
aboard the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, Putin awarding medals to special forces
officers, Putin visiting a nuclear submarine launching a missile 17... On this occasion, the
official press omitted to point out that the missiles being launched by the President had
been built in the late 1980s and were thus inherited from Soviet technology... As the
journalist  Vladislav  Shurygin  makes  clear  in  the  Zavtra  review18,  the  development
programme  for  strategic  nuclear  forces  is  today  under  threat  of  interruption.  The
Russian military-industrial complex has already lost more than two hundred strategic
technologies, for lack of competent staff. Shurygin reports that, for lack of funding, the
work of the Institute for Thermal Research has had to be suspended, which has already
led to a halt in the production of Topol M and Bulava missiles. The article accuses two
ministers of sabotage—German Gref, Economics Minister, and Alexey Kudrin, Finance
Minister.  Similarly,  in 2005,  the Defence Ministry purchased only seven missiles:  so
today there remain only 600 nuclear missiles  to ensure Russia’s  defence,  several  of
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which  are  apparently  urgently  in  need  of  modernisation.  Of  Russia’s  20,000  tanks,
approximately only half are in working order; and of Russia’s 1,800 aircraft, about 1,200
are no longer capable of taking off. The worst of it is that a country that exports so
much oil—and that is planning to increase its exports to China—refuses to provide its
own air-force with fuel, thus preventing its pilots from training. Since 2000, efforts to
modernise the armed services have been limited to the acquisition of 15 T-90 tanks, 40
BTR-80  armoured  cars,  24  SU-27  aircraft,  three  TU-160  bombers  and  two  KA-50
helicopters. In order to rebuild its military credibility in Asia, the Russian army would
need 1,500 new T-90 tanks a year for ten years. When it comes to the navy, we should
note that, since 2000, the Russian fleet has received not one new ship19.  During the
manoeuvres in the Pacific in 2004, the Russian fleet was even compelled urgently to
recruit civilian mechanics for lack of competent staff. In December 2004, the Northern
Fleet disgraced itself when, in front of President Putin, a nuclear submarine was found
incapable of launching its missile. The C-50 anti-aircraft defence system is no longer
even in a position to protect the airspace around Moscow or Russia’s other industrial
centres. These failings in the modernisation of the Russian armed forces are even more
troubling in that they coincide with China’s reinforcement of its People’s Liberation
Army,  which  has  not  given  up  the  option  of  a  massive  deployment  of  tanks  and
infantry: the threat posed by such overwhelming numbers of available troops is backed
by China’s huge population.
11 The Russian state has by now finished “using up” the Soviet nuclear inheritance. Only
until 2015 should Russia be capable of responding to an external threat: in the (very
hypothetical)  case of  a  war with China,  Russian military forces would have enough
missiles to destroy China’s entire military and civil infrastructure.
12 Vadim  Soloviev,  Editor-in-Chief  of  the  Independent  Military  Review  (Nezavisimoe
Voennoye  Obozrenie)  even forecasts  the  complete  destruction of  the  Russian  army
within a few years if the funding allocated to it is maintained at its present level20. This
situation would be the most dangerous possible: in the event of war, it would leave
Russia no alternative but to use its nuclear arsenal.
13 In this context, the military exercises (officially styled as “Peace Mission 2005”) jointly
organised  during  the  summer  of  2005  (August 18th-26th),  in  which  2,000  Russian
soldiers and 8,000 Chinese soldiers took part,  look like nothing more than a photo-
opportunity. Climaxing like a theatrical production with a joint parade of paratroops of
the Russian and Chinese special forces and with a fanfare of music and firecrackers, the
exercises  were  mainly  aimed  at  demonstrating  the  military  capacities  of  the  SCO
members21. 
14 Moreover,  in  July  2005,  forces  of  the Russian Far  East  army carried out  large-scale
military exercises. These were the first Russian manoeuvres since the fall of the USSR
to deploy practically all the land, air and naval forces scattered across the whole of the
military region of the Russian Far East. The objective was to prepare a counter-attack
against a hypothetical aggressor, particularly in areas close to the Pacific Ocean and on
Love River. These Russian exercises were much more ambitious than “Peace Mission
2005”, which was organised in China a month later. The comparison between these two
operations, both in complexity of forces deployed and in numbers, seems to indicate
that Russian military chiefs are more alert to the likelihood of an attack on Russia by its
neighbours than they are eager for co-operation within the SCO.
Russia in Central Asia: trying to regain its footing
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15 Given the condition of its armed forces, one may wonder whether Russia’s means can
really match up to its ambitions in seeking to strengthen its influence in Central Asia.
Also, one needs to take account of domestic policy factors within the former Soviet
Republics and in particular of the threats posed to the stability of the governments in
place.
16 In  Kyrgyzstan,  the  Tulip  Revolution  of  March  2005  finished  off  the  government  of
President Askar Akayev after ten years of stability. Little by little, the country is sinking
into  chaos;  Kyrgyzstan has  become a  battlefield  between clans  in  the  south of  the
country who support the new President Kurmanbek Bakiev—former Prime Minister—
and  the  northern  clans  supporting  the  Prime  Minister  Felix  Kulov,  a  former  KGB
general.  This  competition between the two men risks destroying the fragile Kyrgyz
state. Another serious threat is posed by organised crime, poised to take over both the
economy and the politics of this small country. No government decision is safe from
sabotage by corrupt officials. Attempts at eliminating the most dangerous groups of
bandits, made by Kulov, were not supported by the President of the Republic and came
up against protests by many deputies who threatened to take their complaints to the
constitutional court. If civil war does break out, it is inevitable that foreign military
forces (Russian, American or others) will interfere, to prevent the agitation provoked
by criminal elements from developing into an Islamic revolution that might destabilise
the entire region. Some Russian military analysts22 consider that if Kyrgyzstan were
overtaken by a complete political collapse, Russia and Kazakhstan could impose some
kind of protectorate until stability could be re-established and new elections held.
17 In this scenario, the United States would allow Moscow to take action in Kyrgyzstan,
because most of its own resources would already be mobilised in Iraq and Afghanistan—
and probably  in  Iran  and  Syria.  Russian  help  would  then be  welcomed—and much
preferred to that of  China.  Indeed, if  Russia did not dare to put itself  forward as a
stabilising force, China might use Uyghur separatism23 as a pretext for sending troops
to Kyrgyzstan and taking control of the Republic. In 2006, in the Kyrgyz town of Och,
the headquarters of the war against terrorism and drug trafficking is to be established,
in the charge of the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), an arm of the CSTO.
Setting  up  this  HQ  appears  also  to  suit  national  Kyrgyz  interests24:  it  could  be  a
protective barrier for the state against unrest or civil war25. In Soviet times, a frontier
guards base and an airbase were positioned at Och; this infrastructure has been well
preserved and could rapidly be brought back into service by these collective regional
stabilisation forces.
18 In the context of a peacemaking mission to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan would seem more
legitimate than Uzbekistan: for one thing, the Kazakhs are ethnically and culturally
much closer to the Kyrgyzes than the Uzbeks (in particular, they share with them a
moderate approach to Islam); for another, Uzbekistan insists on its territorial claims to
Kyrgyzstan, whereas Kazakhstan does not. For this reason, any attempt at interference
from Tashkent in Kyrgyz affairs would create a significant risk of ethnic conflict, which
might spread across the region if Kazakhs committed troops to help in Kyrgyzstan.
19 The likelihood of Russian intervention in the case of destabilisation of Kyrgyzstan is
increased  by  rumours26 of  an  intervention  by  special  forces  of  Russian  military
intelligence,  the  GRU,  in  Bishkek,  during the Tulip  Revolution,  at  a  time when the
Kyrgyz  army  and  police  were  in  a  state  of  paralysis.  There  exists,  moreover,  a
precedent  for  intervention  by  post-Soviet  Russia  in  Central  Asia:  in  1992,  Russian
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special forces and frontier guards went into the city of Dushanbe in Tajikistan to carry
out  a  bloody  “peacemaking”  operation.  After  the  Russian  frontier  guards  were
withdrawn, according to the terms of the bilateral Russo-Tajik agreement of 2004, the
Tajik-Afghan frontier came under the exclusive control of Tajik national forces. For all
that, Russia has not cut back its military presence in that Republic: the 201st Division of
the Russian Federal Army has been redeployed as a Russian military base in Tajikistan.
Beyond its acceptance of the presence of Russian ground forces, the Tajik government
has also permitted Russia to reactivate an airspace guidance centre set up during Soviet
times in the Pamir Mountains, which will give Russia the means to control the airspace
of Asia and the South Pacific.
20 Even  so,  the  probability  of  Russian  military  interference  in  the  case  of  a  crisis  in
Kyrgyzstan is set back by the condition of the Russian forces at present based in the
country,  despite  the  existence  of  the  Kant  airbase.  This  Russian  base  on  Kyrgyz
territory, set up in 2003, was officially garrisoned at the end of 2004 by 700 men with 20
aircraft. Yet, by the end of 2005, the numbers were down to 200 soldiers and officers
and 5 aircraft27. For lack of funding, instead of maintaining real military strength in
Kyrgyzstan, Moscow can support only a moderate force there.
21 Neither does any significant strengthening of relations with the Uzbeks seem to be on
Moscow’s  agenda,  despite  the  tensions  between Uzbekistan and the  Americans  and
Europeans following the Andijan crackdown. The friendship treaty signed on November
14th  2005  by  Vladimir  Putin  and  Islam  Karimov  is  a  direct  consequence  of  these
tensions  along  with  the  expulsion  of  US  troops  from  Uzbekistan—both  these
developments confirming the decline of Uzbek co-operation with the West. One might
have supposed that Russia would take advantage by recovering the Harshi-Hanabad
base. But the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov, announced that Moscow had no
intention in the near future of sending a military contingent to Uzbekistan. Once again,
the explanation is purely financial: Russia does not dispose of sufficient funds to finish
the rebuilding of its base in Tajikistan (the former 201st Division of the Federal Army)
to secure a real presence in Kant. Another reason for this stubbornness, one that puts
into perspective Russian weakness in the region, is that in reality Russia may, in the
terms of the November 14th 2005 Treaty, send its forces at any time to any airbase it
chooses. So the advantages conceded to Russia by the Uzbeks are more significant than
those they conceded to the Americans in 2001.
22 Russia’s revived interest in Uzbekistan has resulted from the attitudes of the United
States and Europe towards the Uzbek government. Tashkent was afraid that the West
desired  the  overthrow  of  the  government  and  was  really  supporting  attempts  to
achieve it. Its fears were reinforced by the highly critical response of the international
community  after  the  Andijan  crackdown.  It  does  seem  that  President  Karimov’s
strategy since 1991, sharing out his favours between the United States and Russia, has
run  out  of  steam:  his  break  with  the  West  seems  definitive.  Uzbekistan  wants  to
modernise its army and it knows that only Russia will agree to sell it military hardware
and help to train its officers, without criticising its authoritarian regime. For all that,
such a sudden political about-face is not irreversible, after 15 years of ostensibly even-
handed policy  towards  Russia  and the  other  Central  Asian  Republics  while  seeking
rapprochement with the United States. Uzbek hesitations over joining the CSTO28 are
an  illustration.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  after  the  Andijan  events29,  the  CSTO
unambiguously supported the Uzbek government’s decision to crush the revolt30. While
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the change of course is difficult for the Uzbeks, it is just as hard for Russia to restore its
own confidence in Tashkent.  It  is  hardly likely that Uzbekistan will  become, in the
immediate  future,  Russia’s  closest  partner  in  Central  Asia—for  the  present  it  is
Kazakhstan that plays this role. Indeed, the links between Kazakhstan and Russia are
close and of long standing. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Kazakh Khanates (djuz)
voluntarily sought Russian protection, to avoid the fate of the Dzungars, of whom more
than  a  million  were  massacred  a  few  years  before  by  the  Qing  army31.  In  1992,
Kazakhstan  and  the  Russian  Federation  signed  a  friendship  and  co-operation
agreement,  guaranteeing  Russian  military  protection  for  Kazakhstan—protection  in
particular from the Chinese threat32. Today, more than a million Kazakhs are Russian
citizens and have been living in Russia for many generations.
23 It  is  probable  that  Moscow takes  advantage of  the  rivalry  between Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to play a dominant role in Central Asian affairs. Despite having only half
the population, Kazakhstan is for the present better-suited for playing this role than
Uzbekistan, because the Kazakhs are less influenced by radical Islamism. Moreover, the
unemployment rate in Kazakhstan is lower than in Uzbekistan, and the country is not
threatened  by  shortages  of  water  resources.  Further, Kazakhstan  is  also  more
politically stable: the government of Nursultan Nazarbayev seems safe from “colour
revolutions”, thanks mainly to its efficient security services. By contrast, the failure of
the Uzbek authorities to control the situation in Andijan may be directly related to the
policy  on  national  security  followed  for  more  than  a  decade,  favouring  repression
rather  than propaganda,  the  mechanisms for  which,  inherited  from the  USSR,  was
dismantled. In years to come, Russia will be paying close attention to the succession to
President  Karimov’s  leadership:  its  expectation  is  that  this  will  put  the  finishing
touches to Uzbekistan’s rapprochement with Russia.
A union between Moscow, Minsk and Astana?
24 In the short term, Russia’s priority seems to be to strengthen its position within the
CSTO and especially to pursue the process of integration with Kazakhstan and Belarus33
while allowing the Commonwealth of Independent States to die a slow death. Founding
a  political,  economic  and  military  union  around the  “heart”  of  the  Soviet  Union—
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan—is frequently mentioned by deputies of the Duma (the
lower house of the Federal Parliament) and regional governors. One of the most ardent
defenders of this cause is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Duma deputy and leader of the Liberal
Democratic  Party  of  Russia―whose  radical  nationalist  political  programme is  often
useful to the Kremlin in attracting waves of criticism, before its essential proposals are
taken  up  within  federal  government  legislation.  At  the  far  end  of  the  political
spectrum, the idea of an alliance between former Soviet Republics receives a favourable
reception among members of the Russian Communist Party, which is today Russia’s
main opposition party.
25 Forming a union of this kind can only be a painful process: it means that each of the
countries  taking  part  must  give  up  part  of  its  own  sovereignty.  Real  integration
presupposes that Russia will be able to propose forms of co-operation that will be really
attractive to its neighbours. These might include creating a military union aimed at
guaranteeing the survival of governments within a harshly competitive environment,
or  an  economic  union  of  sufficient  weight  to  influence  the  movement  of  natural
resources prices on the world market. Paradoxically, it seems that there is stronger
resistance coming from Russia than from Belarus or Kazakhstan. Part of the Russian
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political elite is opposed to building up Russia within the post-Soviet area, preferring to
see their country as an energy resource to the “civilised world”34. Russia does have the
means to rebuild a union with its two closest neighbours, but Moscow is not making
available  the  necessary  funding.  Instead  of  investing  the  income  from  its  natural
resources in economic programmes, social or military, it prefers to invest them in the
American  economy—on  the  pretext  of  guarding  against  inflation.  In  these
circumstances, the prospect for building a real union across a substantial part of the
post-Soviet area is still distant, and will depend on whether the governing classes truly
desire  to  see  their  country  strengthened.  Indeed,  the  rebuilding  of  Russian  power
within  its  own  region  can  be  based  only  upon  a  change  of  domestic  policy  and  a
heightened desire to  serve the national  interest.  Patriotism of  this  kind,  such as  is
cultivated among China’s elite, seems to be lacking in Russia.
Strengthening the CSTO, a response to the threat of war in Iran
26 At the beginning of March 2006, it was obvious that Russia’s attempt to negotiate with
Iran over the Iranian nuclear programme had failed35: the Iranian Foreign Minister was
refusing  Moscow’s  proposals.  Russian  television  then  announced  that  the  Russian
government had made every possible effort to avoid war in the region, but that Iran
had not shown any co-operation: the Iranians’ suicidal attitude was preventing Russia
from blocking US attempts to launch a sanctions campaign against Iran. From now on,
Russian  diplomacy  will  be  focused  on  the  regional  consequences  arising  from  a
potential military conflict. It envisages in particular the ecological disaster created by
radioactive contamination of large areas of Central Asia and around the Caspian Sea, as
well as the possible massive exodus of the Iranian population towards neighbouring
countries—a humanitarian catastrophe that could be far greater than that experienced
in  Kosovo  or  Iraq  and  that  would  affect  Russia’s  southern  borders  as  well  as
Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
27 Another foreseeable consequence of a war in Iran would be an explosive increase in the
Muslim diaspora (the Umma), especially in Western Europe, and the radicalisation of
various Islamic groups in the countries of Central Asia, the (putative) American attack
on Iran being considered as an offensive by Western Christian civilisation against the
Muslim  world36.  Israel’s  participation  in  this  war—which  is  possible  given  Iran’s
possession  of  ballistic  missiles  capable  of  reaching  Israeli  soil—could  push  Arab
countries into joining the war on the Iranian side. Waging war in Iran could turn out
far more difficult  for the Americans than in Iraq.  Civilian casualty figures could be
terrifying;  and  a  war  of  this  kind  could  destroy  any  chance  of  dialogue  between
civilisations or cultures.
28 Russia  today  seems  to  be  better  placed  than  the  United  States  or  the  European
countries  to  extend  its  dialogue  with  the Muslim  world,  by  reason  of  its  Muslim
population  (20%  of  Russia’s  total  population).  At  the  international  level,  Russia’s
affiliation to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) as an observer country
does give Moscow certain advantages. Russia might be a good intermediary to negotiate
between  the  West  and  “politically  incorrect”  governments  with  whom  Western
countries refuse to hold discussions. The visit to Moscow by a Hamas delegation and
Russia’s discussions with Iran are examples of this. Historically, Russia’s leaders have
long  experience  of  using  the  mechanisms  of  clandestine  diplomacy;  the  Soviet
Communist Party’s old contacts files might prove useful, particularly the one for North
Korea37.
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29 Inside  the  country,  the  structure  of  the  Russian  state  allows  each  large  Muslim
community  to  exercise  all  the  instruments  and  mechanisms  for  legal  democratic
administration, inside the borders of the different autonomous Republics. It is clear
that this policy is based on a balance between the different interests of regional leaders
favouring the central  Russian government.  The political  system created at the time
when  the  Soviet  state  was  being  built  continues  in  general  to  function.  Regional
governments are able, with the exception of Chechnya, to control the situation inside
their own autonomous territories and to prevent Muslim extremists from endangering
national stability in Russia. A system of this kind, offering real autonomy, within the
context of a federation, to Muslim minorities, is unthinkable in the countries of the
European Union.
30 Sanctions against Iran, possibly followed by war, could entail serious consequences for
the Chinese economy, which imports a significant quantity of Iranian oil. The impact
on China would have repercussions for European companies with investments there.
Low oil  prices enable China to keep prices down within its domestic market,  which
favours foreign investment. Fluctuations in oil prices, which might then stabilise at a
higher level, could force the Chinese leaders into forming a new conception of China’s
economic development. They might seek to base their economic growth on
strengthening their geostrategic position across the Asia-Pacific region: such expansion
might very probably be not entirely peaceful38. Indeed, if China saw itself forced into
foreign  aggression,  its  energy  resources  being  limited,  it  might  have  to  seek  a
substitute for Iranian oil with the utmost urgency. This energy requirement also drives
China into strengthening its claim on the Russian energy market and on Kazakhstan.
Yet, the infrastructure for transporting oil and gas from these territories towards China
is  not  yet  sufficiently  developed  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  Chinese  economy.
Accordingly, one may expect China soon to press for a speed-up in the building of the
Angarsk-Daqing  oil  pipeline  and  the  gas  pipeline  destined  to  link  Kazakhstan  with
Xinjiang (the West-East project).
31 The two most important decisions announced during President Putin’s visit to Peking
in March 2006 were taken against this background: strengthening co-operation in the
arms market (China wishing to acquire more military equipment from Russia) and co-
operation over oil  supplies (a co-operation that seemed to have been inactive since
2004). At the time of writing, China has been given no clear response from Russia on the
timescale for starting building work on the Russian stretch of the Angarsk-Daqing oil
pipeline. Furthermore, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has not been
able to acquire any stock in the Russian oil company Sibneft, which would have given it
a stake in the Russian market. Russia’s recent concessions towards China—as agreed
during Putin’s visit—can be understood within the context of the threat of war against
Iran: in exchange for a dominant position in the Chinese market in the fields of energy
and military supplies, Russia agrees to supply oil and gas so long as deliveries are not
interrupted by armed conflict. Thus, the contracts signed by Gazprom will make China
the world’s largest importer of Russian gas39. Two years ago, the project to build a gas
pipeline from East Siberia into China did not exist; what has radically altered the state
of play is the development of the situation in the Middle East.
32 A further consequence of Putin’s visit to China is that energy co-operation with China
will free Moscow of the fear that it might not be able to sell its natural resources, in the
event  that  the  European  Union  decided  to  stop  importing  Russian  gas.  The
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diversification of its energy sources, which Europe intends as a way of minimising its
dependence on Russia, has been balanced, from Moscow’s point of view, by diversifying
Russia’s outlets with the increase of business in the Far East. In this race, Russia is today
further ahead than Europe.
33 On the military side, Russia has also begun taking preventive measures in case there
should be war in Iran. On February 6th 2006, the Secretary-General of the CSTO, Nikolai
Bordyuzha, went to Tashkent to propose to President Karimov that he should bring
Uzbekistan speedily back into the CSTO, of which it was a member up until 1999. The
two  men  also  spoke  about  Uzbekistan  joining  the  “Canal  2005”  operation  against
terrorism and drug trafficking. The Uzbeks showed themselves helpful and responsive.
The Uzbek army and special forces have made contact with their counterparts in CSTO
member countries to stem the flow of drugs and radical Islamism out of Afghanistan.
34 Military  chiefs  of  the  unified  command  of  the  CSTO  countries  have  prepared  an
agreement on “Collective forces in the collective security zone in Central Asia”40. One
pillar of these collective forces will be the “rapid deployment force” of 11 battalions:
three Russian, three Kazakh, three Tajik and two Kyrgyz. They will consist of special
forces  regiments,  highly  trained  and  well  equipped.  Russia  is  still  ready  to  send
reinforcements,  battalions  of  heavy  armour,  communications  battalions,  several
squadrons of transport aircraft and combat helicopters. Chinese army forces will not be
part of this structure41.
35 In the long term, the creation of a military and political alliance in Central Asia would
enable member countries of the CSTO to build a common policy in the energy field,
towards the European Union and China in particular. Such a union would, in effect,
permit them to dictate the price of oil and gas across the whole of the Eurasian area.
36 The creation of an alliance across the territory of the former Soviet Union, with Russia
as a leading member, seems at the present time to be unlikely, due to the weakness of
the Russian state.  The battle  between Russia  and Ukraine over  gas  prices  does  not
reflect  the  strengthening  of  Russia’s  position  in  the  area  of  the  Commonwealth  of
Independent States (CIS). Rather, it portends the dismantling of this organisation in its
existing form.  What  are  preventing Russia  from building up a  military presence in
Central Asia are financial constraints. Over the months ahead, the most that can be
achieved will probably be small military shows of force and photo opportunities: Putin
at the controls of military aircraft. The rapprochement with China will take practical
shape only within the limits of the SCO, that is to say, with no acceptance of mutual
obligations.  Furthermore,  while  Russia  does  favour  the  development  of  this
organisation, it is mainly so that China, in playing its part, should fall in line with the
collective  decisions  being  taken,  rather  than pursue  its  own independent  policy  in
Central Asia.  Similarly,  Russian initiatives within the context of the CSTO, of which
China is not a member, are aimed at creating a force able to match China’s power in
Central  Asia,  to  remedy the present weakness of  each of  the members in isolation.
Changes in this inconsistent foreign policy would require changes in the Kremlin: a
new  leadership  intent  on  developing  the  national  economy  and  maintaining  a
reasonable distance both from the West and from China.
37 The  vast  majority  of  people  within  the  Russian  political  elite  do  not  favour  the
resurrection of  the USSR;  a  union founded on compulsion would be useless.  Russia
needs  loyal  allies.  Moscow’s  present  eagerness  in  seeking  out  allies  is  a  sign  of
weakness:  if  Russia were powerful,  it  would not have to go to such lengths to find
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friends.  They  would  put  themselves  forward  in  a  more  natural  way.  Russia’s
contradictory manoeuvring vis-à-vis China denotes the fearfulness of a country that
sees itself having to survive between two hostile powers: the West,  which offers no
prospect of co-operation, and China, more and more aggressive in its economic and
military growth. In these circumstances, the Russians’ approach is dictated by the wish
to guarantee the present frontiers of their state.
38 Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
NOTES
1. The Collective Security Council of the CSTO is at present chaired by the Russian
President, Vladimir Putin; its Secretary General is Nikolai Bordyuja, the former head of
Russia’s frontier guards. Between 2004 and 2005, military chiefs of the member
countries of the CSTO organised a series of manoeuvres named “Rubej 2004, 2005”
(Line of defence 2004, 2005). These manoeuvres were designed to evaluate the capacity
of the army commanders of the former Soviet republics to co-ordinate their efforts in
the event of war. The secret services of the CSTO countries also launched a special
operation, “Canal 2005”, aimed at creating a security cordon around Afghanistan to
stem the flow of drugs and Islamic terror. This operation was automatically renewed
for the year 2006.
2. See the newspapers Rossiyskaya Gazeta (www.rg.ru) and Krasnaya Zvezda
(www.redstar.ru), and the magazine Itogi (www.itogi.ru). See also the Internet sites 
www.utro.ru, www.strana.ru, www.kreml.org, www.vor.ru, www.polit.ru.
3. For more information on the structures of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation
(SCO) as well as a historical perspective, see the work of the expert on Sino-Russian
relations Alexander Lukin and in particular “Shanhaiskaya Organizaciya
Sotrudnichestva: strukturnoe oformleniye i perspektivy razvitiya” (The SCO: Structural
formation and prospects for development) This article is available on the website of the
Moscow Institute for International Relations (MGIMO), which trains the officials of the
Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Russian Federation, at the address http://mgimo.ru/
fileserver/2004/nauka/az-04.pdf. Alexander Lukin is also Director of the Centre for
Research on East Asia of the MGIMO. 
4. At the height of the Bishkek crisis, Russian television (www.ortv.ru) showed the
intervention of several special forces groups, of “unidentified origin”, entering the city
to disperse the crowd.
5. These would be Russian political movements of the left, the extreme left and the
extreme right.
6. The Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (created and led by Evgeny
Primakov) is a non-governmental organisation that lobbies the Russian central
government on behalf of big Russian and foreign enterprises. Primakov continues to
exert powerful influence over Russian foreign policy, especially in Asia. The Kremlin
still sends him on confidential missions in the role of essential mediator.
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7. We should cite Colonel-General Ivashov (today an independent military analyst who
was, in 1999, Deputy Chief of Staff at the Russian Foreign Ministry), the ex-chief of the
KGB analysts Lt. General Leonov (member of the working group in the Namakon
research centre, headed by the former chief of KGB special operations) and Major-
General Drozdov. Several researchers at the Moscow Far-East Institute have also
produced interesting work on this subject: A.B. Bolyatko, G.D. Agafonov, V.P. Zimonin,
A.S. Krasilnikov, V.B. Yakubovskij, V.P. Kudinov, A.G. Yakovlev, A.I. Sizonenko, A.A.
Sveshnikov, A.G. Yurkevitch, P.B. Kamennov, M.V. Demtchenko, N.B. Gorbatchev. The
review Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Observations) is of
particular interest: it publishes articles by experts and by Russian army and special
services veterans on military and geostrategic questions. This magazine is directed by
V. Solovyev.
8. Iliyas Sarsembaev, “La question territoriale: enjeu géopolitique et idéologique dans
les relations sino-russes”, thesis supervised by Professor Dominique Colas, Paris,
Institut d’Études Politiques, 2005.
9. In this context, the ignorance of history among many Russian politicians is a
problem. In the terms of the Bandung declaration, April 18th 1955, China declared that
it would not be part of any military or political bloc. After relations between the two
communist parties were re-established in 1989, following Gorbachev’s visit to Peking
and his meeting with Deng Xiaoping), Moscow did make, on several occasions, attempts
to invite Peking to join the Warsaw bloc, but the Chinese government referred back to
the Bandung declaration in declining the Kremlin’s proposal. Today, there are no clear
signs that the Chinese government is ready to change that position.
10. Viktor Stefashin, “Sovremennye voenno-doktrinal’nye vzglâdy rukovodstva K.N.R.”
(Present-day views of the leaders of the PRC on military doctrine), a report delivered to
the Scientific Conference of the Far East Institute in Moscow in 1993.
11. This theme was first raised on December 23rd 1998, during the official visit of
Evgeny Primakov, then Prime Minister, to New Delhi.
12. Iliyas Sarsembaev, “Puissances régionales en Asie-mythes et réalités”, Les Nouvelles
de Chine, n° 17, June-July 2004.
13. On May 20th 2005, the Far East Institute in Moscow organised a conference on the
theme: “Problems over improving the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and
cooperation between China and Russia in Central Asia”. Present were Russian
Sinologists, diplomats from the Russian Foreign Ministry, and experts and analysts
from the Russian Defence Ministry. According to the report prepared by the head of the
Research Centre into the Problems of the SCO and Regional Security of the Far East
Institute, A Bolyatko, and the Centre’s scientific attaché, A. Klimenko, the CSO is at
present at the very start of being changed into a real political union. http://www.ifes-
ras.ru/conf/2005/4-2005.html
14. Viktor Larin is the Director of the Institute of Ethnography of the Far East
(Vladivostok) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He has accused local authorities of
falsifying their border lines with China and has personally implicated the Governor of
the Primorye Region, E. Nazdratenko. Viktor Larin, Kitaj i Dal’nij Vostok Rossii v pervoj
Polovine 90-h: Problemy regional’nogo vzaimodejstviya (China and the Russian Far East in
the first half of the 1990s: the problems of cooperation), Vladivostok, 1999. See also
Viktor Larin, Kitaj i Dal’nij Vostok Rossii (China and the Russian Far East), Vladivostok,
1998.
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15. Yuri Galenovich is one of the leading figures of the Institute of the Far East in
Moscow. He is considered one of the most eminent Sinologists in Russia. Yuri
Galenovich, Rossiâ i Kitaj v 20 veke: Granica (Russia and China in the Twentieth Century:
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Centre of Convertible Education.
16. According to the Russian Federal Security Service, there are no statistics on the
number of Chinese citizens in the Russian Federation, and specifically none on their
numbers in the Russian Far East. The frontier guard service, which is part of the FSB
and is the main body responsible for legal control of foreigners in Russia, collects
absolutely no data on the numbers of foreigners. The figures that appear in the work of
foreign researchers—or Russian researchers—can thus not be taken for anything better
than estimates. 
17. Television reports of President Putin on board the nuclear bomber launching the
missile were transmitted repeatedly on various Russian federal networks: www.ortv.ru 
www.rtr.ru www.ntv.ru www.newsru.com. 
18. Zavtra, October 5th 2005 (No. 40), p.12, www.zavtra.ru.
19. www.vif2ne.ru claims to be the “independent forum for the Russian armed services,
veterans of the Soviet army and of the special forces”. It is interesting to compare the
officers’ assessment of the state of the Russian armed forces with the official reports
published on the Defence Ministry website: http://www.mil.ru/articles/
article3431.shtml.
20. Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (Independent Military Review), No. 44, November
18th 2005, p. 3. This article is online on the review’s website: www.nvo.ng.ru
21. The manoeuvres were staged in the Shandong peninsular. The Russians were
represented by regiments from the Russian Far East, the 11th Russian Air Force Army
(two Tu-95 MS strategic bombers, four Tu-22 M3 bombers, four Su-27 SM fighters, four
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forces of the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry and rail regiments.
22. They are a group of analysts, including former Soviet and Russian information
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written under pseudonyms: www.namakon.ru. 
23. A significant part of the Uyghur diaspora is settled in the capital cities of
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 
24. Legally speaking, CSTO forces have the right―written into the treaty―to intervene
in Kyrgyz affairs if the country’s stability is threatened.
25. Interviews carried out in CSTO agencies.
26. Russian television has broadcast coverage, but without comment. The Defence
Ministry has neither confirmed nor denied the story.
27. Personal observations.
28. The CSTO members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and
Tajikistan. Apart from a few joint military exercises as well as some political dealings
aimed at facilitating the defence of common positions within the SCO, the CSTO is still
in an embryonic state.
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32. Official Chinese historiography considers the whole of Kazakhstan as part of
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
33. On December 1st, 2005, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would allow
its political allies (and in particular fellow members of the SCTO) to benefit from low
“domestic” prices for their arms purchases. This offer was to include the training of
military and special services personnel.
34. This expression was proposed by Russian democrats in the late 1980s and early
1990s to designate the West, in opposition to Russia.
35. Moscow was proposing the creation of a common Russo-Iranian company that
would enrich uranium on Russian soil. That would have helped to keep a sanctions vote
off the UN agenda and prevent the outbreak of war initiated by the United States.
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K.N.R.”, op. cit.
39. China National Petroleum Corporation and Gazprom agreed to “unfreeze” the
Kovytkinsky project (east Altay) and to start building in 2007 a gas pipeline from Russia
into China. For more information, see the report by Sergei Luzyatin (MGIMO): “Rossiya
i Kitai: v poiskah novogo vektora sotrudnichestva. K itogam vizita V. Putina”. (Russia-
China: in search of new avenues of cooperation. On the results of Vladimir Putin’s visit
to China). www.mgimo.ru. 
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41. Figures and information offered here were provided to the writer by members of
the SCTO staff in Moscow.
RÉSUMÉS
This article offers a reflection on Russia’s attitude towards possible alliances in Asia. There are
numerous constraints, imposed by Russian domestic issues, and such collaborations could prove
difficult.  In view of this it  is  clear that there is  little practical  prospect of any real strategic
partnership between Russia and China at the present time.
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